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Abstract
Most water management problems are multi-
level and multi-actor problems characterized
by a high degree of substantive and strategic
uncertainty. For social scientists it is an
interesting question which institutions are
needed for solving these problems. In this
paper it is argued that new practices of
network governance (interactive, participatory
or open planning processes) are a promising
alternative to state power, but that more
research is needed on sources of network
governance failure. Based on observations
made of the room for the river policy process, it
is concluded that we are in need of an
intelligent combination of strategies of network
governance and state power for solving our
water management problems.
Introduction
‘Institutions matter’ is a famous statement by
the Nobel prize winner for economics North.
Institutions are, in the widest sense, rules.
They can either be formal, such as Acts and
the Dutch ‘House of Thorbecke’, or informal,
such as the Dutch consensus decision making
culture. Anyone who has ever participated in
an international research or policy project may
have experienced why institutions matter
(Meijerink, 1999).
Institutions often show considerable
inertia. Nevertheless, some institutions can be
purposefully designed (De Bruijn et al., 2002).
We may for example decide on the
introduction of a market for water services or a
‘watertoets’ for decision making on land-use
policies (Wiering & de Rooij, 2004). In this
paper we address the issue of institutional
design for solving wicked water management
problems.
Wicked water management
problems
Most water management problems are wicked
problems. Characteristic to these problems are
that multiple governmental and non-
governmental parties at multiple levels of
government are involved in problem solving.
These parties generally have different problem
perceptions and policy preferences. Moreover,
resources needed for problem solving, such as
legal, financial and political resources, are
distributed amongst them. Finally, wicked
policy problems are characterized by
uncertainty (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). The
‘Room for the River’ issue, for example, is
characterized by both substantive (river
discharges expected) and strategic uncertainty
(e.g. about strategic behavior of regional and
local parties).
Markets, hierarchies and networks
for water management
It is useful to think about the institutions
needed for solving such wicked water
management problems. Basically we can draw
on three types of institutions: markets,
hierarchies and networks (Thompson et al.,
1991). Markets are very good at providing
private goods. We might think about
possibilities for organizing a market for drinking
water supply, sewerage and/or waste water
treatment, though we should be extremely
careful with that, and it is necessary to protect
public values, such as water quality or equal
access to water services. For the provision of
public goods, such as dikes, or common
goods, such as clean water resources, there is
a serious risk of market failure. In these cases
markets do either produce negative
externalities, such as water use or pollution to
the detriment of others, or free riders, i.e.
parties that do not pay for a good or service,
but nevertheless enjoy its benefits.
Because of these market failures
government plays an active role in water
resources management in most countries. In
the past decades, however, the water sector
has experienced that state power or hierarchy
is not very successful in solving wicked
problems either. Stakeholders that feel they
are worse off with newly developed policies as
compared to the status quo often try to
frustrate policy implementation successfully.
Hierarchy invokes strategic behavior, and in
policy controversies scientific research is often
used strategically. Rather than a disinterested
search for truth, the policy process, then, is
characterized by partisan use of research
results and reports. The river dike
strengthening controversy of the eighties is a
clear example of such a ‘dialogue of the deaf’
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(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), and
therefore of government failure.
For these wicked policy problems network
governance (or interactive decision making) is
a promising alternative, mainly as it aims at
conditioning a joint learning process. We may
distinguish between processes of substantive,
strategic and institutional learning (Koppenjan
& Klijn, 2004). Substantive learning is learning
about cause-effect relationships, policy
alternatives and impacts of these alternatives.
Strategic learning refers to learning about the
perceptions and preferences of others, and the
need to take into account these other parties’
perspectives by developing more cooperative
strategies. Finally, institutional learning refers
to the development of shared norms and
expectations, and the development of a culture
of trust. The processes of deliberation and
negotiation aimed at the preparation of a
regional advice in the Dutch Room for the
Rivers project are an interesting example of
such learning. The parties involved learned
about the many policy alternatives, the many
possible combinations and their impacts. They,
however, also learned about possibilities to
combine different policy objectives in multi-
purpose plans, and by that to address different
problems at the same time. In spite of these
substantive and strategic learning processes,
the relationship between some parties
remained rather tense, and a culture of trust
has hardly developed. Among other things, this
may be explained by the rather coercive
strategies the Dutch national government has
used in the controversy over the designation of
emergency flooding areas (Meijerink, 2004).
Network governance failure
As more experiences have been gained with
the new practices of network management
now, policy scientists have begun to address
the sources of network management failure. In
spite of the rather positive observations made
of the Room for the Rivers policy process so
far, it should also be noted that there has been
a permanent risk that problems and costs are
passed on to other parties or levels of
government. This particularly concerns parties’
willingness to take policy measures for the
benefit of areas and parties situated more
downstream. Moreover, not in all cases it will
be possible to reach a consensus or
negotiated agreement. In the end, we may well
need state power to solve these dilemmas of
network governance.
Hierarchy or state power should neither
be used to simply impose policies nor should
interactive policy making be used to create
public support for policies that already have
been decided upon. Hierarchy, however, may
be used fruitfully to create a sense of urgency,
which implies that deliberations and
negotiations take place within the ‘shadow of
hierarchy’: if parties will not be able to reach an
agreement, central government will have to
take a decision in the end. Finally, state power
may be used to impose conditions that
safeguard coordination at higher levels of
scale. The safety objectives for the Dutch
rivers imposed by the Dutch national
government are a good example of that.
Conclusions
Whilst policy scientists have given ample
attention to sources of market failure and
government failure since long, they have only
just begun to address sources of network
governance failure. From recent experiences
with network governance in Dutch river
management we may learn that strategies of
network governance have been rather
successful so far, but that there are some
dilemmas of network governance as well, and
that we may well need state power to solve
these dilemmas.
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